ERISA PREEMPTION OF STATE MANDATEDPROVIDER LAWS
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 19741 ("ERISA"

or "the Act") is a comprehensive federal statute which imposes minimum standards on employee benefit plans. To prevent conflicting state
2
regulation, ERISA preempts state laws which "relate to" these plans.

ERISA's preemption, however, is not complete. Consistent with the federal policy embodied in the McCarran-Ferguson Act 3 of leaving the regulation of insurance to the states, Congress saved from ERISA

'4
preemption any state law which regulates "insurance."
States have enacted legislation that requires insurers to pay for the

services of a particular type of health care provider, even if the terms of
the policy specify that payment will be made only to another type of
provider. 5 These "mandated-provider" laws, as they are called, 6 "relate
to" employee benefit plans because they change the terms of the insurance policies purchased by these plans. 7 Thus, unless mandated-provider
laws regulate "insurance," such laws are preempted by ERISA as applied
to employee benefit plans. The question whether mandated-provider
laws are laws that regulate "insurance" is important because of the prev-

alence of such statutes, 8 the large number of individuals covered by in1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982))
[hereinafter cited as ERISA].

2. Id. § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
3. Ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982)).
4. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1982).
5. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
6. Mandated-provider laws are also referred to as "freedom-of-choice" laws, and "antidiscrimination" laws. Chupack, PreferredProvider Organizations,6 AM. C. SURGEONS BULL. 36, 36
(1984). Although the term "mandated-provider laws," as used in this note, refers specifically to laws
that require insurers to reimburse certain types of health practitioners, the analysis presented here is
equally applicable to laws that require insurers to reimburse certain providers of other kinds of
policy benefits, such as legal services. See infra note 47.
7. See infra text accompanying note 36 and note 52.
8. Mandated-provider laws regulating health insurance policies have been adopted in nearly
every state. See ALA. CODE § 27-1-10 (1975) (chiropractors); id. § 27-1-11 (dentists); id. § 27-19-39
(optometrists); id. § 27-1-15 (Supp. 1985) (podiatrists); id. § 27-1-18 (Supp. 1985) (psychologists and
psychiatrists); ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.355 (1984) (nurse midwives); id. § 21.89.040 (optometrists);
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-1406 (1975 & Supp. 1985) (optometrists, opthalmologists, podiatrists,
nurse practitioners, and licensed providers); id. § 20-1406.01 (Supp. 1985) (psychologists and chiropractors); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3212.2 (1980) (optometrists); id. § 66-3212.4 (podiatrists); id.
§ 66-3212.6 (psychologists); id. § 66-3212.8 (Supp. 1985) (dentists); CAL. INS. CODE § 10176 (West
1972 & Supp. 1986) (psychologists, social workers, counselors, speech pathologists, audiologists,
registered nurses, psychiatric mental health nurses, chiropractors, dentists, podiatrists, opticians,
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surance plans, and the significant effect such statutes have on the
optometrists, and occupational therapists); id § 10176.2 (physical therapists); COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 10-8-103(3)(a) (1973) (osteopaths, dentists, optometrists, psychologists, chiropractors, and podiatrists); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-174d (West Supp. 1985) (psychologists, psychiatrists, and
social workers for child guidance clinics); id. § 38-174h (dentists); id. § 38-174q (occupational therapists); id. § 38-174v (nurse midwives, nurse practitioners, and psychiatric mental health clinical
nurse specialists); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2101(c) (1981) (optometrists); id. § 511 (Supp. 1984)
(podiatrists); id § 717 (chiropractors) (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.419 (West 1984) (dentists, optometrists, and podiatrists); id. § 627.6406 (nurse midwives); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-27(b)
(1982) (psychologists and chiropractors); id. § 33-24-27.1 (optometrists); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 431-450 (1976) (optometrists); id. § 431-499 (dentists); id. § 431-500 (Supp. 1984) (psychologists);
IDAHO CODE § 41-2103 (1977) (podiatrists and optometrists); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 364
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (dentists); id. § 370b (osteopaths and chiropractors); id. § 370c (psychologists); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-6-1 (Bums 1975 & Supp. 1985) (dentists, health service providers in
psychology, podiatrists, osteopaths, optometrists, and chiropractors); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 509.3,
514.7 (West Supp. 1985) (optometrists); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2,100 (1981) (optometrists, dentists,
and podiatrists); id. § 40-2,104 (psychologists); KY. REv. STAT. § 304.18-095 (1981) (optometrists
and osteopaths); id. § 304.18-097 (dentists); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:662 (West 1978) (podiatrists); id. § 22:664 (optometrists); id. § 22:665 (psychologists); id. § 22:668 (chiropractors); id.
§ 22:213.1 (West Supp. 1985) (dentists); id. § 22:669 (social workers) (West Supp. 1985); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2744 (1985) (psychologists, social workers, and psychiatric nurses); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 490 (1979) (podiatrists); id § 477-0 (1979 & Supp. 1985) (social workers);
id. § 477T (Supp. 1985) (nurse practitioners); id. § 489 (Supp. 1985) (chiropractors); id. § 490A
(Supp. 1985) (psychologists); id § 490A-2 (Supp. 1985) (nurse midwives); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
175, § 108B (Michie Law. Co-op. 1977) (dentists); id. § 110 (optometrists and podiatrists); id.
§ 108D (Michie Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985) (chiropractors); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.2243
(West 1983) (optometrists); id. § 500.3475 (psychologists, chiropractors, and podiatrists); id.
§ 500.2239 (West Supp. 1985) (dentists); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62A.043 (West Supp. 1985) (dentists
and podiatrists); id § 62A.15 (optometrists, chiropractors, and registered nurses); id. § 62A.152
(psychologists); Miss. CODE ANN. § 83-41-203 (1972) (optometrists); id. § 83-41-209 (Supp. 1985)
(dentists); id. § 83-41-211 (Supp. 1985) (psychologists); idt § 83-41-213 (Supp. 1985) (nurse practitioners); id. § 83-41-215 (chiropractors) (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.936(1l)(b) (Vernon
Supp. 1986) (optometrists, chiropractors, dentists, psychologists, pharmacists, and podiatrists); id.
§ 354.027 ("person[s] duly licensed" to perform covered services); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 33-22-111
(1985) (dentists, osteopaths, chiropractors, optometrists, chiropodists, psychologists, social workers,
nurse specialists, and pharmacists); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-513 (1984) (osteopaths, chiropractors,
optometrists, psychologists, dentists, and podiatrists); NEv. REv. STAT. § 689A.380 (1985) (dentists, osteopaths, chiropractors, oriental medicine, podiatrists, and optometrists); id. § 689B.038
(psychologists); id. § 689B.039 (chiropractors); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 415:18-a (1983) (licensed
pastoral counselors, psychologists, and psychiatrists); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27-50 (West 1985)
(psychologists); id. § 17B:27-51 (optometrists); id. § 17B:27-51.1 (chiropractors); id. § 17B:27-51.8
(dentists); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-22-32 (Supp. 1985) (optometrists, psychologists, podiatrists, and
nurse midwives); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3221 (McKinney 1985) (nurse midwives and social workers); id.
§ 4235 (physical therapists, podiatrists, optometrists, dentists, psychiatrists, psychologists, and chiropractors); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-260 (1982) (optometrists, podiatrists, dentists, chiropractors, and
psychologists); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3923.23 (Page Supp. 1984) (osteopaths, optometrists, chiropractors, and podiatrists); id. § 3923.231 (psychologists); id. § 3923.232 (dentists); id. § 3923.233
(nurse midwives); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 6051 (West 1976) (optometrists); id. § 3634 (West
Supp. 1985) (podiatrists, psychologists, and clinical social workers); id. § 6055 (West Supp. 1985)
("any practitioner licensed under the healing arts"); OR. REv. STAT. § 743.117 (1983) (optometrists); id. § 743.123 (psychologists); id. § 743.128 (nurse practitioners); id. § 743.132 (dentists and
denturists); id. § 743.135 (clinical social workers); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1511 (Purdon Supp.
1985) (osteopaths, dentists, chiropractors, podiatrists, and physical therapists); id. § 3002 (nurse
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structure, administration, and cost of insured plans. 9
Insurers are generally opposed to mandated-provider laws because

they induce many employee groups to self-insure plans,10 create disuniformities in multistate plans, increase the cost of plan administration,

and force insurers to pay less effective or less efficient providers."I Insurers and employee groups are also opposed to mandated-provider laws

because they interfere with insurers' attempts to lower costs by forming
preferred provider organizations (PPOs),' 2 where insurers contract with
13
exclusive groups of providers.
midwives); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-25 (1979) (chiropractors and osteopaths); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 38-35-90 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985) (podiatrists, optometrists, and oral surgeons); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 58-17-53 (Supp. 1985) (optometrists); id. § 58-17-54 (dentists, osteopaths, chiropractors, and podiatrists); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-108 (Supp. 1985) (optometrists, clinical psychologists, podiatrists, and social workers); id. § 56-7-116 (chiropractors); id. § 56-7-1002 (dentists); TEx.
INS. CODE ANN.§ 21.35A (Vernon 1981) (psychologists); id. § 21.52 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (podiatrists, dentists, chiropractors, optometrists, audiologists, and speech-language pathologists); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 31-20-3 (1974) (optometrists); id. § 31-27-24 (Supp. 1985) (dentists, chiropractors,

chiropodists, optometrists, psychologists, social workers, and "other practitioner[s] of the healing
arts"); VA. CODE § 38.1-347.1 (1981) (chiropractors, optometrists, opticians, psychologists, clinical
social workers, and podiatrists); id. § 38.1-348.5 (dentists); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.20.390
(1984) (podiatrists); id. § 48.20.410 (optometrists); id. § 48.20.411 (registered nurses); id.
§ 48.20.412 (chiropractors); id. § 48.20.414 (psychologists); id. § 48.20.416 (dentists); W. VA. CODE
§ 33-6-30 (1982) (dentists, podiatrists, chiropractors, and optometrists); id. § 33-16-3e (Supp. 1985)
(registered nurses and nurse midwives); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 628.33 (West 1980) (chiropractors); id.

§ 632.87 (West Supp. 1985) (optometrists); Wyo. STAT. § 26-22-101 (1983) ("person[s] licensed
under laws of this state to treat the illness or disability or perform the health services"); id. § 26-13109 (dentists).
9. See infra notes 11-15 and accompanying text. Most health insurance policyholders arc
covered under group insurance issued to an employer or other group. See HEALTH INSURANCE
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA 1984-1985, at 11-15.
10. See Kosterlitz, States Increasing Their Regulation of Health Plans' Benefits, Eligibility
Rules, 17 NAT'L J. 2913, 2914 (1985). States are prohibited from regulating self-insured employee
benefit plans as "insurance." See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
11. See, eg., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 51 Md. App. 122, 132, 441 A.2d
1098, 1104 (1982) (vice-president of Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. and others testified that state
mandated-provider law would have "drastic" effect on employee benefit plans, "adversely affecting
to a substantial degree, costs, administration, uniformity of benefits, processing and payment of
claims, and appeal procedures on denial of them"), rev'd, 296 Md. 334, 463 A.2d 793 (1983); Pierce,
Health Insuranceon the StatehouseFloor: 1985 Projections, HOSPITALS, Feb. 1, 1985, at 52, 57-58.
12. The American Hospital Association Section for Multihospital Systems defines PPOs as "organizations to facilitate an arrangement between providers of health care (hospitals, physicians, and
others) and buyers of health care." Schroer & Taylor, A Survey ofPreferredProviderOrganizations,
HoSPrrALS, March 16, 1984, at 85, 85. "Almost by definition, PPOs are limited membership organizations." Clanton, PlanningPPOsto Minimize Antitrust Risk HOSPITALS, March 1, 1985, at 96, 98;
see also Kunz, Hospitals'PPOsFace Hard Times, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Feb. 1, 1984, at 60, 60. As
of December, 1984, there were 141 operational PPOs. Ritter, PPONetworking Up: HMOs Grow 15
Percent, HOSPITALS Dec. 16, 1984, at 52, 52. See generally S.TIBBETS & A. MANZANO, PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS: AN EXECUTIVE'S GUIDE (1984) (discussing various aspects
of PPOs).
13. See, e.g., Congress Eyeing Ways to Ease Pathfor FasterGrowth ofPPOs, AM. MED. NEws,
Nov. 4, 1983, at 2, 2, 10. See generally Berger, Selective Contracting: California'sHot Potato?,
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Proponents of mandated-provider laws argue that these laws give
insureds freedom of choice of provider and improve the quality of care by
preventing insurers from refusing to reimburse health care providers
other than those with whom the insurer has specifically contracted. 14 In
addition, non-physician health care providers have tended to favor man-

dated-provider laws because non-physician providers, in particular, have
15
tended to be excluded from reimbursement.

Though ERISA's statutory language sheds little light on what Congress intended to save from preemption as laws that regulate "insurance," 16 the Act's legislative history suggests that Congress intended to

preempt mandated-provider laws. 17 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
has clearly delineated what laws regulate "insurance" in a line of cases

interpreting the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. ' 8 This note argues that ERISA's insurance saving clause should be construed consistently with the McCarran-Ferguson Act, because both Acts serve the
same federal policy and use similar language to describe what is left to

the states.19 This note concludes, through an application of the principles set forth in cases interpreting the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson
Hosp. F., Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 7 (discussion of merits of California law that allows contracting with
exclusive groups of providers).
A PPO may be sponsored by an insurer, a group of physicians, hospitals, or other health care
providers, or it may be freestanding. Stromberg, Duncheon, and Goldman, PPOs and the Antitrust
Laws, HosPrrALs, Oct. 16, 1983, at 65, 65. In an insurer-sponsored PPO, the insurer goes beyond
the normal insurance function of insuring against specific casualty losses: the insurer acts as a
purchasing agent for insureds in obtaining volume discounts from specific "participating providers."
Id. PPOs offer financial incentives, such as lower deductibles, to subscribers who use providers who
have agreed to participate in the PPO. Rothenberg, PPOs: Critical Elements in Their Design,
HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT.Oct. 1983, at 32, 32. In exchange for the assurance that they will receive
more patients, the participating providers offer services at a discount from full charges and submit to
the PPOs utilization review. Id Mandated-provider laws, however, require insurers to reimburse
non-participating providers on the same terms as the participating providers. Insurer-sponsored
PPOs are thus unable to create financial incentives to encourage subscribers to use participating
providers. See id. at 34. Without the assurance that they will receive more patients, providers have
no incentive to offer discounts to insurers. Id. at 33.
14. See, eg., Hopkins & Davis, Restricted Choice-A Liability of Alternative Delivery Systems,
58 FLA. B. J. 145, 145 (1984). See generally Berger, supra note 13, at 8-11 (insurer's ability to
contract selectively with exclusive group of providers affects quality of care); Davy, PreferredProvider Organizations, 38 AM. J. OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY 327, 328-29 (1984) (PPOs may fail to
provide rehabilitative services such as occupational therapy); Havighurst, Doctors andHospitals: An
AntitrustPerspective on TraditionalRelationships,1985 DUKE L.J. 1071, 1155 n.274 (persons insured
on group basis who would prefer coverage entitling them to patronize a particular class of providers
may not have their preferences recognized if they constitute minority of group).
15. Pierce, supra note 11, at 57; see, eg., Griffith, Who Will Become the Preferred Providers?,
1985 AM. J.NURSING 539, 541.
16. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 71-105 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
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Act, that "mandated provider" laws do not regulate "insurance" and
20
thus should be preempted by ERISA.

I. ERISA's INSURANCE-SAVING CLAUSE
ERISA regulates employee pension plans, which provide for retirement and deferred income,2 and welfare benefit plans, which provide for

medical, disability, and other non-pension benefits. 22 ERISA was enacted to protect the benefit rights and retirement security of plan participants and beneficiaries.2 3 The Act achieves this by establishing

minimum reporting, disclosure, participation, funding, and vesting standards for employee benefit plans and places fiduciary duties on plan man-

agers. 24 To eliminate potential confusion caused by coextensive state
regulation, ERISA contains a broad preemption provision declaring that
the statute shall "supersede" state laws that "relate to" employee benefit
plans.2 5 The preemption provision is substantially qualified, however, by

its "insurance saving clause," which saves from preemption any state law
'2 6
that "regulates insurance."

Employee benefit plans may purchase insurance for their participants or they may self-insure. Those plans that purchase insurance, socalled "insured plans," are governed by state laws that regulate "insur20. See infra notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
21. ERISA § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1982). An employee pension plan is defined as any
fund or program maintained by an employer or employee organization, or by both, which results in a
deferral of income or provides retirement income to employees. Id.
22. Id § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). An "employee welfare benefit plan" is defined as any fund
or program maintained by an employer or employee organization, or by both, which provides for
medical, disability, death, unemployment, prepaid legal service, or other non-pension benefits. Id.
The term "employee benefit plan" can refer to an employee pension plan, an employee welfare benefit plan, or both. Id. § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3).
23. For a discussion of ERISA's objectives, see generally Hutchinson, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act: Origins and Objectives, 14 FORUM 611 (1979). The Act has been described as the "most comprehensive overhaul of the private employee benefit system to date."
Brummond, FederalPreemption ofState InsuranceRegulation Under ERISA, 62 IOWA L. REV. 57,
59 (1976) (footnote omitted).
24. Title I of ERISA establishes regulatory standards for employee benefit plans subject to the
-Act in a five part scheme. ERISA §§ 2-514, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1145 (1982). Part one imposes
reporting and disclosure requirements for all employee benefit plans covered by the Act. Id. §§ 101.
111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-103 1. Parts two and three apply only to pension plans, and create standards
in such areas as vesting, participation, and funding. Id. §§ 201-211, 301-306, 29 U.S.C. §§ 10511061, 1081-1086. Part four establishes fiduciary standards for the management of employee pension
and welfare benefit plans. Id §§ 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114. Part five provides a scheme of
administration and enforcement that applies to pension and welfare benefit plans. Id. §§ 501-515, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1131-1145.
25. Id. § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
26. Id. § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
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ance" because of ERISA's insurance-saving clause. 27 In contrast, state
insurance laws are preempted to the extent that they purport to regulate
28
self-insured employee benefit plans.
One way states have sought to regulate insured plans is through
"mandated provider" laws, which require insurance companies to pay
for the services of particular types of health-care providers if the services
they provide are covered by the health insurance policy. Mandated-pro-

vider laws prevent health insurers from excluding certain types of health
care providers (e.g., optometrists) from receiving payment for services
covered under the insurer's policies, even if the terms of the policies authorize payment only to some other type of provider (e.g., ophthalmologists). 29 Some mandated-provider laws also prevent insurers from
reimbursing some providers at a greater rate than other providers of the
30
same type of service.
The scope of ERISA's insurance-saving clause and the relationship
of that clause to the general preemption provision have been a source of
controversy and litigation.3 1 Much of the difficulty in determining

whether state laws that regulate insured plans are saved from preemption

32
by ERISA stems from the "linguistic overlap" of these two clauses.
27. See Brummond, supra note 23, at 67-92 (discussing ways state insurance regulatory
schemes may affect employee benefit plans).
28. The insurance-saving clause is qualified by a "deemer clause," which states that no employee benefit plan shall be "deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer. . . for purposes
of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies." ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1982). The Supreme Court has subsequently, in dictum, interpreted the
deemer clause to prohibit states from regulating self-insured employee benefit plans as a special type
of insurance. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 2390 (1985); see also
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 571 F.2d 502, 504 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978).
29. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 27-19-39 (1975). The statute provides:
Whenever any policy of insurance. . .provides for reimbursement for any visual service in
Alabama which is within the lawful scope of practice of a duly licensed optometrist...
the insured or other person entitled to benefits under such policy shall be entitled to reimbursement for such services, whether such services are performed by a duly licensed physician or by a duly licensed optometrist, whichever the insured selects, notwithstanding any
provision to the contrary in any statute or in such policy, plan or contract.
Id.
30. See, eg., UTAH CODE ANN.§ 31-27-24 (Supp. 1985). The statute provides in part:
(1) No insurer shall make or permit any unfair discrimination in favor of particularindividuals orpersons or between any duly licensed professional groups who are authorized by
law to render similar services, including physicians and optometrists licensed to perform
similar ocular or optometric services.
Id. (emphasis added).
31. For a discussion of the scope of the insurance-saving clause and its relationship to the
general preemption clause, see Brummond, supra note 23, at 93-122; Kilberg & Heron, The Preemption of State Law Under ERISA, 1979 DUKE L.J. 383, 394-403; Manno, ERISA Preemption and the
McCarran-FergusonAct: The Need for CongressionalAction,52 TEMP. L.Q. 51, 58-60 (1979); Okin,
Preemption of State Insurance Regulation by ERISA, 13 FORUM 652, 655-67, 670-78 (1978).
32. Manno, supra note 31, at 58.

1200

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1985:1194

The preemption clause of ERISA broadly preempts state laws that "relate to" employee benefit plans. 33 The insurance-saving clause, however,
saves from preemption state laws that regulate "insurance. '34 To the
extent that many employee benefit plans are "insured plans," Congress

appears to have restored to the states, through the insurance-saving
clause, the ability to regulate as "insurance" much of the same activity it

had excepted from state regulation through the preemption clause.3 5
Mandated-provider laws arguably "relate to" insured employee benefit plans because they dictate which providers will supply plan benefits,

and ultimately affect the plan's cost, structure, and administration. 36 A
more difficult question is whether mandated-provider laws are laws
which regulate "insurance" within the meaning of ERISA's saving

clause. The difficulty here is exacerbated by both the lack of a statutory
definition of "insurance" 37 and the sparse discussion in the Act's legislative history of the relationship of the insurance-saving clause to the general preemption clause.

The scarcity of legislative history on this specific question is explained by the manner inwhich the preemption clause was added to the
Act. The preemption clause was entirely redrafted shortly before ERISA
was adopted. 38 The original House version of ERISA generally limited
the scope of preemption of state regulation to areas expressly covered by
the bill. 39 The more sweeping language of ERISA's preemption clause
was adopted during the bill's final consideration in the House-Senate
conference committee. 4° Statements made in the House and Senate debates indicate that Congress intended the preemption clause to occupy
33. The preemption provision provides that, with certain exceptions, ERISA shall "supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."
ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982).
34. The insurance-saving clause provides that "[e]xcept as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subehapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State
which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." Id.§ 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)
(1982).
35. Manno, supra note 31, at 58-59.
36. See infra note 52.
37. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Whaland, 119 N.H. 894, 901, 410 A.2d 635, 639 (1979).
38. Okin, supra note 31, at 653-55.
39. See H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 514, 120 CONG. REc. 4717, 4742 (1974). The Senate
altered H.R. 2 to preempt state law insofar as it "relate[s] to subject matters regulated by this Act or
the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act." H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 699(a), 120 CONG.
REc. 5002 (1974) (as amended by Senate). For a discussion of the legislative history of ERISA's
preemption provision, see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1298-1300 (N.D. Cal.
1977), aff'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978). See also Kilberg & Heron,
supra note 31, at 390-92; Turza & Halloway, Preemption of State Law Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 163, 166-69 (1979).
40. See S.Rep. No. 1090, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 514(a) (1974).
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the entire field of employee benefit plan regulation. 4 1 The preemption
clause was thus entirely redrafted at the last minute, with no specific
consideration given to the consequences of the redrafted clause for state
mandated-provider laws. 42 The reason behind the change in the preemption clause, however, suggests that Congress would have intended
ERISA to preempt mandated-provider laws if it had specifically considered the question. The ERISA preemption clause was broadened largely
because organized labor and consumer groups feared that states and bar
associations would block the formation of "closed panel" prepaid legal
plans, which provide legal services through a group of participating lawyers. 43 These interest groups wanted to prevent states and professional
associations from enacting regulations favoring "open panel" prepaid
legal plans, which allow all lawyers to participate. 44
The floor debates on the preemption clause show that Congress intended to preempt state regulations which would prevent the formation
of closed panel plans. Senator Javits, one of ERISA's floor managers,
stated:
Since plans subject to federal supervision would include plans providing prepaid legal services, it is intended that state regulation-but not
bar association ethical rules, guidelines or disciplinary actions-in regard to such plans be preempted. But the State, directly or indirectly
through the bar, is preempted from regulating the form and content of
a legal service plan, for example, open versus closed
panels, in the guise
45
of disciplinary or ethical rules or proceedings.
Following this statement, another of ERISA's floor managers, Senator
Williams, concurred with Senator Javits's views on preemption, stating
41. See, e.g., 120 CONG. R~c. 29,933 (1974) (remarks of Senator Williams) (preemption "is
intended to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of State or local governments"); ia at 29,197
(remarks of Rep. Dent) ("[T]he conferees, with the narrow exceptions specifically enumerated, applied this principle in its broadest sense to foreclose any non-federal regulation of employee benefit
plans.")
42. Okin, supra note 31, at 654. Although the insurance-saving clause was included in its current form in bills introduced several years before ERISA's enactment, see, eg., S. 3589, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. § 18, 116 CONG. REc. 7280, 7284, 7288 (1970), the House and Senate conferees did not file
their reports disclosing the change in the preemption clause until ten days before ERISA was passed,
see 30 CONG. Q. ALmANAC 252, 252-53 (1974).
43. Okin, supra note 31, at 654; Turza & Halloway, supra note 39, at 205-06. The preemption
provision was changed, at least in part, in reaction to the American Bar Association's amendments
to the Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-101 and DR 2-103, both of which disfavored closed
panel plans. Turza & Halloway, supra note 39, at 205 & n.248. Two votes taken in the conference
committee supported preemption of state laws that regulated prepaid legal service plans in this manner. Pfennigstorf & Kimball, Employee Legal Service Plans: Conflicts Between Federaland State
Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 787, 802 n.71. For a discussion of ERISA preemption of legal service plans, see Pfennigstorf & Kimball, supra.
44. Okin, supra note 31, at 654; Pfennigstorf & Kimball, supra note 43, at 802-03, 828-29;
Turza & Halloway, supra note 39, at 205 & n.248.
45. 120 CONG. REc. 29,949 (1974).
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that Congress was "giving employers and unions the freedom to develop
'46
and operate legal service plans of their choice."

Because Congress intended to preempt state regulations which require prepaid legal plans to reimburse nonparticipating lawyers, it is rea-

sonable to infer that Congress would have intended to preempt similar
state regulations which require other types of insured welfare benefit
plans (e.g., medical and dental plans) to reimburse nonparticipating
providers. 47

II. THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT DEFINITION OF

"INSURANCE"

AND METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE Co. v.
MASSACHUSETTS

In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,48 the Supreme
Court interpreted ERISA's insurance-saving clause in determining

whether a Massachusetts statute that required insurance policies to provide certain mental health benefits was preempted as applied to policies

purchased by employee benefit plans. 49 Such "mandated-benefit" statutes, as they are called, require insurers to include coverage for certain

medical conditions, such as mental illness. 50 "Mandated-benefit" laws
thus differ from "mandated-provider" laws in that the former add to the
coverage, while the latter require an insurer to pay for the services of
additional providers without broadening the scope of coverage.5 1
The ERISA question upon which the decision in Metropolitan Life
turned was whether the mandated-benefit law was a law that regulated
46. Id See also id. at 29,933 (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("State professional associations acting
under the guise of State-enforced professional regulation, should not be able to prevent unions and
employers from maintaining the types of employee benefit programs which Congress has authorized-for example, prepaid legal services programs-whether closed or open panel .... ).
47. ERISA includes legal service plans in its coverage of welfare benefit plans. ERISA § 3(1),
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982). Some legal service plans provide services to groups on a prepaid basis.
Brummond, supra note 23, at 75. Such plans transfer and spread the risk of the need for legal
services, and hence, have been considered by most commentators as an insurance arrangement. Id.
at 76. See also Pfennigstorf & Kimball, Legal Service Plans: A Typology, 1976 AM. BAR FOUND.
RESEARCH J.411, 423-25. Some states have attempted to regulate legal service plans under insurance laws. Pfennigstorf & Kimball, supra note 43, at 797-98. Hence, legal service plans encounter
the same preemption conflicts as health care benefit plans with regard to state regulation of insurance. See Turza & Halloway, supra note 39, at 204.
48. 105 S.Ct. 2380 (1985).
49. Id. at 2383.
50. Id.
51. For example, a mandated-benefit law may require insurers to provide vision care coverage
in all health insurance policies they issue. In contrast, a mandated-provider law may require the
insurer to reimburse optometrists as well as ophthalmologists if the insurer elects to provide vision
care coverage. The Metropolitan Life Court recognized these differences, observing that mandatedbenefit statutes are therefore "only one variety of a matrix of state laws that regulate the substantive
content of health-insurance policies." Id. at 2384.
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"insurance" so as to be excepted from preemption by ERISA's insurance-saving clause.5 2 The Court held that the mandated-benefit law was
53
saved from preemption by the insurance-saving clause.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court ascribed the difficulty of discerning the scope of the insurance-saving clause to two factors: the complexity of the statutory language, which the Court lamented was "not a
model of legislative drafting, '5 4 and the lack of explanation in ERISA's
legislative history as to the intended breadth of the insurance-saving
clause.5 5 The Court recalled, however, that it had interpreted virtually
52. Id. at 2388-89.
The Court reached this question only after concluding that the mandated-benefit law "clearly
'relate[d] to'" employee benefit plans regulated by ERISA, and hence fell within the reach of the

Act's preemption clause. Id. at 2389. The Court reaffirmed its decision in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
463 U.S. 85 (1983), where the phrase "relate to" was given "its broad common-sense meaning such
that a state law 'relate[s] to' a benefit plan 'in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection
with or reference to such a plan.'" Metropolitan Life, 105 S.Ct. at 2389 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983)). In Shaw the Court concluded that both New York's Human
Rights Law and its Disability Benefits Law "relate[d] to" pension plans governed by ERISA. Shaw,
463 U.S. at 100. The Court rejected the notion that a statute must conflict with one of the subjects
covered by ERISA in order to "relate to" benefit plans. Idl at 98-99. Rather, the Court reasoned
that "[a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan.. . if it has a connection with or reference to such
a plan." Id. at 97. Applying this definition, the Court concluded that "the Human Rights Law,
which prohibits employers from structuring their employee benefit plans in a manner that discriminates on the basis of pregnancy, and the Disability Benefits Law, which requires employers to pay
employees specific benefits, clearly 'relate to' benefit plans." Id.
The Metropolitan Life Court also held that all state laws that fall within the scope of ERISA's
preemption clause are displaced, even those that do not conflict with ERISA's substantive requirements. Metropolitan Life, 105 S.Ct. at 2389. Furthermore, a law need not directly regulate employee benefit plans to be subject to preemption by ERISA; even indirect state regulation of
employee benefit plans is subject to preemption. Id. The Court cited its decision in Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 525 (1981), for the proposition that even indirect regulation of
ERISA plans falls within the scope of ERISA's preemption. Metropolitan Life, 105 S.Ct. at 2389.
In Alessi, the Court held that the New Jersey Workers Compensation Act was preempted by ERISA
insofar as the state law prohibited workers' compensation payments from being set off against pension benefits payable by a pension plan regulated by ERISA. Allesi, 451 U.S. at 526. The Alessi
Court concluded that the statute "relate[d] to" pension plans governed by ERISA. Id. at 524. It
noted that its conclusion was not altered by the fact that the statute "intrudes indirectly, through a
workers' compensation law, rather than directly, through a statute called 'pension regulation.'" Id.
at 525. Rather, "even indirect state action bearing on private pensions may encroach upon the area
of exclusive federal concern." Id.
Applying these principles, the Metropolitan Life Court concluded that Massachusetts's mandated-benefit law, although not denominated a benefit plan law, clearly "relate[d] to" such plans,
because it bore "indirectly but substantially on all insured benefit plans" by requiring them to
purchase specified benefits when they purchased an insurance policy. Metropolitan Life, 105 S.Ct. at
2389.
53. Metropolitan Life, 105 S.Ct. at 2390.
54. Id. at 2389.
55. Id. at 2392 & nn.22-23.
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identical language in the McCarran-Ferguson Act.5 6 It reasoned that because the McCarran-Ferguson Act and ERISA's insurance-saving clause
serve the same federal policy and use similar language to define the scope

of permissible state regulation, the two statutes should be interpreted in a
57
consistent manner.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act58 vests in the states the primary authority for the regulation and taxing of the "business of insurance." The
preamble to the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that "[t]he business of
insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws
of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such

business." 59 It further provides that federal laws shall not indirectly preempt state laws regulating the "business of insurance."' 60 The Metropolitan Life Court maintained that "Congress' 'primary concern' in enacting
McCarran-Ferguson was to 'ensure that the States would continue to
have the ability to tax and regulate the business of insurance.' ",61

The Court recognized that ERISA "appears to have been designed
to preserve the McCarran-Ferguson Act's reservation of the business of
insurance to the States."' 62 It observed that the ERISA insurance-saving
clause and the McCarran-Ferguson Act use similar language to define
what is left to the states: the McCarran-Ferguson Act preserves state
laws that "regulate the business of insurance"; ERISA preserves any
56. Id. at 2391 (citing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982)).
57. Metropolitan Life, 105 S.Ct. at 2392 n.21.
58. Ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982)).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1982).
60. Id. Section 1012(b) states: "No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or
which imposes a fee or tax upon such business .... " Id. § 1012(b).
61. Metropolitan Life, 105 S.Ct. at 2392 n.21 (quoting Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal
Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1979)). See also SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 458
(1969); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429 (1946). Although most litigation concerning the McCarran-Ferguson Act has focused on insurance's qualified exemption from the antitrust laws, Congress's concern with this aspect of federal regulation was "secondary." See Royal

Drug, 440 U.S. at 218.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act was enacted in response to the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n., 322 U.S. 533 (1944). For many years, insurance was thought not to be subject to federal regulation under the commerce clause, the Supreme
Court having held in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8Wall.) 168, 183 (1868), that "[i]ssuing a policy of
insurance is not a transaction of commerce." In South-Eastern Underwriters,however, the Court
reversed Paulv. Virginia and held that the business of insurance was interstate commerce, subject to
federal regulation under the commerce clause. South-Eastern Underwriters,322 U.S. at 553. For a
discussion of the purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, see Weller, The McCarran-FergusonAct's
Antitrust Exemption for Insuranc" Language, History and Policy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 587, 640 (in
adopting McCarran-Ferguson, Congress was primarily concerned with preserving state taxation and
regulation of insurance).
62. Metropolitan Life, 105 S.Ct. at 2392 n.21.

Vol. 1985:1194]

MANDA TED-PROVIDER LAWS

1205

state law that "regulates insurance. '' 63 The similarity of the relevant portions of ERISA and the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the Court observed,
suggests that Congress may have had the McCarran-Ferguson Act in
mind when drafting ERISA's insurance-saving clause. The Court found
further support for this interpretation in section 514(d) of ERISA, which
provides that ERISA's preemption provision may not be construed to
"alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair or supersede any law of the
United States." 64 Thus, section 514(d) prevents ERISA from impairing
the McCarran-Ferguson Act and other federal laws. 65
The MetropolitanLife Court relied upon three criteria, articulated in
earlier cases construing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, that are relevant in
determining whether a particular practice is the "business of insurance":
"first, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a
policyholder's risk; second, whether the practice is an integral part of the
policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and third,
whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry."' 66 Applying these three criteria, the Court held that mandated-benefit laws regulate insurance and are thus excepted from ERISA
preemption by the insurance-saving clause.67 First, the Court concluded,
mandated-benefit laws are intended to regulate the transfer and spreading of risk between insurer and policyholder. 68 Second, mandated-benefit
laws directly regulate an integral part of the relationship between insurer
and policyholder by prescribing the type of insurance benefits the insurer
must sell to the policyholder. 69 Third, mandated-benefit laws are intended to regulate the insurer's relationship with the policyholder directly, and only indirectly to affect providers or others outside the
70
insurance industry.
III.

CASES INTERPRETING THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT

"BusINEss OF INSURANCE" EXCEPTION

An examination of cases interpreting the scope of the McCarranFerguson Act reveals that, unlike mandated-benefit laws, mandated-pro63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d)).
65. Id.
66. Id at 2391 (quoting Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982)) (emphasis omitted).
67. Id. at 2391.
68. Id.
69. Id
70. Id.
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vider laws do not regulate the "business of insurance."'7'
A.

Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co.:
Narrowing the Scope of the "Business of Insurance."

In Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co.,72 the
Supreme Court considered an antitrust challenge to agreements between
an insurer and certain participating pharmacies and was presented with
the question whether these agreements constituted the "business of insurance" within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 73 In Royal
Drug, a Blue Shield plan provided drugs to policyholders through a pharmacy PPO it had established. 74 Blue Shield entered into participating
provider agreements with a number of pharmacies, whereby the pharmacies undertook to sell prescription drugs to policyholders for a two dollar
markup above costs. Policyholders using the participating pharmacies
paid only two dollars per prescription, with the balance being billed directly to Blue Shield. Blue Shield discouraged use of nonparticipating
pharmacies by reimbursing policyholders who used these pharmacies at a
75
lower rate.
In rejecting the McCarran-Ferguson Act defense, the Court held
that the challenged agreements did not involve the "business of insurance."' 76 The Court reasoned that the agreements did not meet the first
criterion for insurance in that they did not spread or underwrite the policyholder's risk, 77 which is an "indispensible characteristic of insurance."7 8 The participating provider agreements did not transfer risk,
because the risk of loss had already been transferred to Blue Shield in its
71. For a discussion of Supreme Court cases interpreting the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, see Kennedy, The McCarranAct: A Limited "Business of Insurance" Antitrust Exemption
Made Ever Narrower: Three Recent Decisions, 18 FORUM 528 (1983).
72. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
73. Id. at 210.
74. Id. at 209.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 212-14.
77. Blue Shield had accepted in its policies the risk that policyholders would be "unable to pay
for prescription drugs during the period of coverage." Id. at 213. The Court explained that the
spreading and underwriting of risk is part of the textbook definition of insurance. Id. at 211 (citing 1
G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 1:3 (2d ed. 1959); R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW

§ 1.2(a) (1971); 1 G. RICHARDS, THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 2 (5th ed. 1952)).
78. Id. at 212, 214. The Court cited for support of this proposition their decision in SEC v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959). In Variable Annuity, the Court held that the
offering of variable annuity contracts that placed all investment risk on the purchaser of the contract
was not within the business of insurance as defined by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. VariableAnnuity, 359 U.S. at 71-73. The Court reasoned that "the concept of 'insurance' involves some investment risk taking on the part of the company." Id. at 71.
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contracts with insureds. 79 Rather, Blue Shield's agreements with participating pharmacies were wholly separate from the insurance contracts between Blue Shield and its policyholders, and merely served to lower the
cost Blue Shield incurred in purchasing drugs.80 Thus, these participating provider agreements were "legally indistinguishable from countless

that may be made by insurance companies
other business arrangements
81
to keep their costs low."
The Court concluded that the participating provider agreements

also did not meet the second criterion for the "business of insurance" in
that they did not involve the relationship between insurers and their poli-

cyholders.8 2 The challenged agreements defined Blue Shield's relationship, not with its policyholders, but with the participating pharmacies.
Thus, the agreements were only peripheral to the relationship between
insurer and insured.8 3 In reaching this conclusion, the Court adopted a
narrower view of what constitutes the "relationship between insured and
policyholder" than the Court's previous decisions would have sug79. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 213-14.
80. Id. at 213.
81. Id. at 215. The Court noted that the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939),
illustrated the distinction between an insurance company's function as an insurer of risks and its
non-insurance functions, which merely lower its costs. Royal Drug,440 U.S. at 225-30. The Jordan
court had held that a health service plan that contracted with specified groups of doctors, hospitals,
and other participating providers to supply medical services to its members was not "insurance."
Jordan, 107 F.2d at 248, stating:
Although Group Health's activities may be considered in one aspect as creating security
against loss from illness or accident, more truly they constitute the quantity purchase of
well-rounded, continuous medical service by its members. ... The functions of such an
organization are not identical with those of insurance or indemnity companies. The latter
are concerned primarily, if not exclusively, with risk. . . . On the other hand, the cooperative is concerned principally with getting service rendered to its members and doing so at
lower prices made possible by quantity purchasing and economics in operation.
Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 228 (emphasis in original) (quoting Jordan, 107 F.2d at 247).
82. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 215-16. The Court cited for support its decision in SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969), which established that not all laws that regulate insurance
companies regulate the "business of insurance." In that case, the Court considered whether a state
law governing the relationship between insurance companies and their shareholders was a law regulating the business of insurance as the phrase is used in the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id. at 457.
The Court, in holding that the statute did not regulate insurance, id., reasoned that the McCarranFerguson Act did not make states supreme in regulating "all the activities of insurance companies,"
but only in regulating those activities that comprise the "business of insurance." Id. at 459 (emphasis supplied).
The "focus" of the business of insurance is on the "relationship between the insurance company
and the policyholder." Id. at 460. Thus laws that regulate the various other activities of insurance
companies, such as their relationship to stockholders, do not regulate the" 'insurance' relationship."
Id.
83. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 216.

1208

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1985:1194

gested. 84 The Court indicated that although arrangements that affect the
benefit an insurer confers upon policyholders are the "business of insur-

ance," not all aspects of an insurer's relationship with insureds are the
"business of insurance." 85 The Court acknowledged that the pharmacy
agreements were referred to in the insurer's contracts with insureds, and
that the agreements affected the insureds' premiums, 6 choice of pharmacy, and amount and method of reimbursement for the prescription
drug benefit.87 These factors, however, did not affect the "wholly separate nature" of the two categories of agreements. 88
The Court further concluded that the pharmacy agreements failed
the third criterion for the "business of insurance" because they involved
parties who were wholly outside the insurance industry. 9 The Court
noted that the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption typically applies only
to entities that are within the insurance industry. 90 Although the partici-

pating pharmacies were engaged in business with an insurer, they were
not themselves insurers or part of the insurance industry. 91

84. The Court's prior decisions suggested a broader view. As noted by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Pireno v. New York State Chiropractic Ass'n, 650 F.2d 387 (2d
Cir. 1981), aff'd sub. nom. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982), when the
Supreme Court held in SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), that the business of insurance concerns the insurer-policyholder relationship, the Court sought merely to exclude the "markedly different" relationship of insurer to stockholder. Pireno, 650 F.2d at 394 (citing National
Securities, 393 U.S. at 460). Thus, the NationalSecurities Court did not consider what aspects of the
insurer-policyholder relationship constituted "insurance." Pireno, 650 F.2d at 394.
In affirming the narrow view of the "relationship between insurance company and policyholder" adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Royal Drug,the Supreme Court noted that its decision was
"in conflict with" the broader view of this relationship adopted by the Third Circuit, see Frankford
Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 554 F.2d 1253, 1254 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 860 (1977),
the Fourth Circuit, see Anderson v. Medical Ser., 551 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1977) (mem.), and the
District of Columbia Circuit, see Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262, 268
(D.C. Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded mem., 440 U.S. 942 (1979). See Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at
208 n.2, aff'g 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977). Courts taking a broad view of the insurer-insured
relationship had concluded that agreements between insurance companies and non-policyholders
were within the scope of the business of insurance because of the substantial effects these agreements
had on areas such as the limitation of costs, settlement of claims, and rates charged to subscribers.
See, eg., Manasen v. California Dental Serv., 424 F. Supp. 657, 666-67 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd on
other grounds, 638 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1979); Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 417 F. Supp. 1104,
1109 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'dper curiam, 554 F.2d 1253 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 860 (1977).
85. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 216-17 & n.14.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 209.
88. Id. at 216 n.14.
89. Id. at 231.
90. Id. at 221.
91. Id. at 224.
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Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno: Further
Defining "'Insurance.
"

In Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno,92 the Court used the
same definition of "insurance" to determine whether an insurer's use of a
peer review arrangement was exempt from antitrust challenge under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. 93 In Pireno, an insurer offered insurance policies covering chiropractic treatment that limited the insurer's liability to
the reasonable charges for necessary medical care. 94 The insurer used an
outside panel of chiropractors to review cases and advise them whether
treatments were necessary and charges reasonable. 95
The Court held that the peer review practice failed to meet the three
criteria for "insurance," and was therefore not exempt from antitrust
scrutiny. 96 First, the Court found that the peer review practice had no
role in transferring or spreading of risk.97 The risk of loss for necessary
medical care had already been transferred to the insurer in its contracts
with insureds. Transfer of risk, the Court explained, is complete at the
time the insurance contract is formed. Peer review, however, takes place
only after the policy is formed to determine whether the care the insured
had received was necessary and within policy limits. 98
Second, the insurer's use of a peer review committee was not an
integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and insured. 99
The insurer's peer review practice involved an arrangement with an
outside panel of chiropractors that was separate from its agreements with
its policyholders. °0 The agreements did not affect the benefit the insurer
promised to provide its policyholders, which was to cover the reasonable
costs of necessary chiropractic treatments up to policy limits.10 1 Rather,
a peer review committee was merely a device employed by the insurer to
determine whether the claims were covered by its policies. Thus, the
peer review practices were peripheral to the insurer-insured relationship,
92. 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
93. Id. at 129.
94. I at 122-23.
95. Id. at 123.
96. Id. at 129.
97. Id. at 129-30.
98. Id. at 130. A policyholder who patronizes a more expensive or inefficient provider may be
required by the insurer to pay for services and charges that the peer review committee determines are
unreasonable and unnecessary. The Court explained that the insurer's refusal to reimburse the policyholder does not transfer risk from insurer to insured, because the risk of incurring unnecessary
treatments and unreasonable charges was never transferred to the insurer, but was instead a risk the
insured had retained when the policy was formed. Id at 130-31.
99. Id. at 131.

100. Id.
101. Id. at 132.
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and a "matter of indifference to the policyholder, whose only concern is
10 2
whether his claim is paid, not why it is paid."
Third, the insurer's peer review practices were not limited to entities
within the insurance industry.10 3 The peer review was conducted, not by
the insurer itself, but by an independent panel of chiropractors. 104 Thus,

the insurer's peer review practices involved persons wholly outside the
10 5
insurance industry.
IV.

MANDATED-PROVIDER LAWS AND THE
DEFINITION OF "INSURANCE"

Application of the principles developed in Royal Drug and Pireno

demonstrates that mandated-provider laws do not regulate "insurance"
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
First, mandated-provider laws do not regulate the spreading and

transfer of risk. The risk of loss is transferred in the insurance contracts
with insureds, and the transfer of risk is complete at the time the contract
is formed.10 6 Mandated-provider laws, however, operate after this risk is
transferred to require insurers to reimburse particular providers if those
providers supply goods or services that the insurer is already obligated to
pay for under its policies. Thus mandated-provider laws are like the
pharmacy agreements in Royal Drug and the peer review practice in

Pireno-they act only after the insurer is already obligated to provide the
benefits under the policies.1 0 7 Mandated-provider laws do not regulate
the transfer or spreading of risk, but merely regulate an insurer's subsequent arrangements with providers for the purchase of goods and
102. Id. (emphasis in original).
103. Id.
104. Id at 132-33.
105. Following the Supreme Court's decisions in Royal Drug and Pireno, courts have held that
similar agreements between insurers and other types of providers were not "insurance" within the
meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See Ratino v. Medical Serv., 718 F.2d 1260, 1266-67 (4th
Cir. 1983) (Blue Shield plan's agreements with physicians); Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co., 675 F.2d 308, 336 (D.C. Cir.) (insurer's participating provider agreements with auto body repair shops), cert denied, 459 U.S. 839 (1982); Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Kaiser Found.
Health Plan, 662 F.2d 641, 647 (9th Cir. 1981) (health maintenance organization's agreements with
drug manufacturers); Quality Auto Body, Inc., v. Allstate Ins. Co., 660 F.2d 1195, 1201 (7th Cir.
1981) (insurer's agreements with automobile repair shops), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982); National Gerimedical Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 628 F.2d 1050, 1057 (8th Cir. 1980) (Blue Cross plan's
agreements with hospitals), rev'd on othergrounds, 452 U.S. 378 (1981); St. Bernard Hosp. v. Hospital Serv. Ass'n, 618 F.2d 1140, 1145 (5th Cir. 1980) (Blue Cross plan's agreements with hospitals);
Workman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 520 F. Supp. 610, 624-25 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (insurer's
agreements with automobile repair shops); Hoffman v. Delta Dental Plan, 517 F. Supp. 564, 568 (D.
Minn. 1981) (insurer's agreements with dentists).
106. Pireno, 458 U.S. at 130-31.
107. Cf Pireno, 458 U.S. at 130-31; Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 213-15.
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services.10 8
Second, the mandated-provider laws do not regulate the relationship
between insurer and policyholder. Rather, they regulate the relationship
between the insurer and certain categories of providers. As was the case
with the pharmacy agreements in Royal Drug and the peer review procedures in Pireno, the mandated-provider laws do not change the benefits
the insurer is obligated to provide under its policies. They simply regu-

late factors that are peripheral to the relationship between insurer and
insured, such as the insured's choice of provider and the amount that an

insured who uses a non-participating provider is required to pay.10 9
108. It could be argued that mandated-provider laws do affect the "spreading" of loss because
they affect the ascertainment and settlement of the amount of the indemnity which the insured who
chooses a particular provider is entitled to receive. Although risks are transferred from insured to
insurer at the time the policy is formed, losses are not "spread" among policyholders until they are
ascertained through claims adjustment. See Kennedy, supra note 71, at 536. Arguably, mandatedprovider laws regulate the spreading of loss by regulating claims adjustment.
This argument must be rejected because the Pireno Court held that the transferring or "spreading of. . .a policyholder's risk" is complete at the time the policy is formed. See 458 U.S. at 130
(emphasis added). As one commentator has noted, the Pireno Court, in defining insurance, did not
refer to the normal insurance phrase "spread of loss"; instead, the Court referred to the "awkward"
phrase "spreading of risk." Kennedy, supranote 71, at 536. The Court's reference to the "spreading
of risk" is technically incorrect; it is not the risk-meaning "chance of Ioss"-that is spread by
insurance, rather, it is the loss itself that is spread. Id. Thus, one result of the Pireno Court's
narrowing of the scope of "insurance" to events occurring at or before policy issuance is to exclude
claims-settlement activities from the scope of "insurance," since these activities must necessarily
occur after the policy is issued. Id at 536-37.
A resulting difficulty with accepting the Pireno Court's definition of insurance is that other wellestablished state laws that regulate the claims and adjustment process, such as laws that require
insureds to file suit within a set time limit after an insured event in order to be indemnified for their
claim, would not constitute "insurance" regulation.
109. Despite the fact that mandated-provider laws ultimately affect whether the claim of an
insured will be paid, mandated-provider laws do not affect an integral part of the relationship between an insurer and insured. In the analogous context of peer review practice, Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting in Pireno, argued that peer review was an integral part of the insurer-insured relationship
because peer review ultimately determined whether an insured's claim would be paid. Pireno, 458
U.S. at 137-38 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Under the peer review practice at issue in Pireno, an
insured who consulted an unreasonably expensive chiropractor was required to pay more than if he
consulted one whose charges were reasonable. Id. at 131.
The majority in Pireno, in rejecting this argument, reasoned that the peer review practice did
not affect the benefit the insurer promised to the insured: payment of the reasonable charges of
chiropractors for necessary treatments. Id at 132. Rather, the peer review practice merely aided
the insurer in determining whether a chiropractor's treatments fell within policy limits. Id. The
Court thus found the situation in Pireno to be directly analogous to that in Royal Drug, where the
Court held that the benefit promised to insureds was not affected by provider agreements that required any insured who selected a nonparticipating pharmacy to pay more for drugs than if he had
selected a participating pharmacy. Id
The Supreme Court's analysis requires rejection of the argument that mandated-provider laws
are an integral part of the insurer-insured relationship because they directly affect the benefit conferred upon the insured. Like the peer review practice in Pireno and the participating provider
agreements in Royal Drug, mandated-provider laws do not affect the benefit promised to insureds
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Third, mandated-provider laws involve entities that are usually

wholly outside the insurance industry. By regulating the relationship between insured and provider, mandated-provider laws have a direct and
that particular medical conditions will be covered. Rather, mandated-provider laws merely affect
which practitioners may provide policy benefits to insureds.
A few courts have held that an insurer's policy agreements with insureds to limit full reimbursement to services provided by specific practitioners are within the "business of insurance" exception
to the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See, eg., Hahn v. Oregon Physicians' Servs., 508 F. Supp. 970, 975
(D. Or. 1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1133 (1983); Health Care
Equalization Comm. v. Iowa Medical Soc'y, 501 F. Supp. 970, 995 (S.D. Iowa 1980) (insurer's
decision not to reimburse chiropractors was "business of insurance" under McCarran-Ferguson
Act); Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 469 F. Supp. 552, 562 (E.D. Va.
1979), affid in partand rev'd inpart, 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
Cf Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Bell, 596 F. Supp. 1053, 1059 (D. Kan. 1984) (Kansas mandatedprovider statute held permissible under commerce clause because Kansas law regulated "business of
insurance" within meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act). These courts have attempted to distinguish the situation in Royal Drug on the basis that Royal Drug involved a challenge to an insurer's
agreements with participating providers, while policy provisions to limit full reimbursement to specific practitioners involve insurers' agreements with insureds. Most courts that have considered the
matter, however, have correctly interpreted Royal Drug and Pireno in holding that agreements to
limit reimbursement to services of specific providers are not the "business of insurance" because such
agreements are tangential to the insurer-insured relationship. See Klamath-Lake Pharmacy v. Klamath Medical Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822
(1983); Hahn v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 689 F.2d 840, 842-44 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1133 (1983); Trident Neuro-Imaging Laboratory v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 568 F. Supp.
1474, 1483 (D.S.C. 1983).
For example, the district court in Virginia Academy of ClinicalPsychologists v. Blue Shield, 469
F. Supp. 552, 562 (E.D. Va. 1979), affid in partand vacated in part, 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981), held a Blue Shield plan's policy of reimbursing psychologists only
when their services were billed through a physician to be the "business of insurance." This holding
was based on a finding that the policy provisions in question involved the relationship between insurer and insured. VirginiaAcademy, 469 F. Supp. at 562. The court reasoned that the situation in
Royal Drug was distinguishable because "[t]he contracts in question here are not between providers
and Blue Shield," as was the case in Royal Drug, "but between subscribers and Blue Shield." Id. at
562.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, reversed, rejecting the
district court's attempt to distinguish Royal Drug. Virginia Academy v. Blue Shield, 624 F.2d 476,
483 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981). The court of appeals recognized that Blue Shield's
refusal to reimburse psychologists directly was analogous to the pharmacy agreements in Royal
Drug: both were "tangential" to the relationship between insurer and insured because neither affected the benefit conferred upon the subscriber. Id. at 483-84. "Their decision regarding psychologists was not whether to underwrite the risk of those disorders or even the need for psychotherapy;
rather it was a question of who they would pay for such services. The coverage remained the same."
Id at 484.
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Klamath-Lake
Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Klamath Medical Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 822 (1983), is not contrary to this conclusion. The situation in Klamath was similar to Royal
Drug in that it involved an insurer that offered an optional pharmacy benefit to subscribers of its
major medical policies. See id. at 1279. Unlike Royal Drug, however, the insurer in Klamath owned
the pharmacies where the drugs were distributed. Id. at 1279-80. Independent pharmacies brought
an antitrust action against the insurer, alleging a tie between the major medical policy and the optional pharmacy benefit, since the latter could only be obtained if the subscriber had the major
medical policy. Id at 1280-81. The Klamath court held that the alleged tying arrangement was
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intended impact on providers. Like the pharmacies in Royal Drug and
peer review committee in Pireno, these providers are parties wholly
outside the insurance industry. 110
V.

CASES CONSIDERING

ERISA

PREEMPTION OF MANDATED-

PROVIDER LAWS

Courts that have considered ERISA preemption of mandated-provider laws are divided over the question whether such statutes "regulate
insurance" within the meaning of the insurance-saving clause.1 1' In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Insurance Commissioner,112 a Maryland
court of special appeals held that a state mandated-provider statute was
3
preempted as applied to an insured benefit plan regulated by ERISA."
The court, applying the criteria for "insurance" of Royal Drug, held that

the mandated-provider statute did not regulate insurance."

4

Focusing

on the criterion that "insurance" must involve the insurer-insured rela-

tionship, the court concluded that the mandated-provider law was tangential to this relationship.'

15

shielded from antitrust scrutiny because the agreement was the "business of insurance" within the
meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id. at 1286.
The situation in Klamath can be distinguished from that in Royal Drug in that the tying claim
did not challenge the insurer's arrangements to provide the pharmacy benefit, as did the antitrust
claim in Royal Drug. Rather, the tying claim in Klamath challenged the pharmacy benefit in the
insurance policy itself.
Hence, the situation in Klamath is analogous to those cases where an insurer's decisions regarding policy benefits are at issue. Cf Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380,
2392 (1985); Anglin v. Blue Shield, 693 F.2d 315, 321 (4th Cir. 1982) (insurer's refusal to offer
plaintiff a policy that did not include his wife was the "business of insurance"); Feinstein v. Nettleship Co., 714 F.2d 928, 933 (9th Cir. 1983) (insurer's decision to offer malpractice insurance only to
members of medical association was the "business of insurance"), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 2346
(1984).
110. Cf. Pireno, 458 U.S. at 132; Royal Drug 440 U.S. at 231.
111. Compare Blue Cross v. Peacock's Apothecary, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1258, 1277 (N.D. Ala.
1983) (state mandated-provider law regulating insurer's pharmacy agreements was preempted by
ERISA) with Blue Cross Hosp. Serv. v. Frappier, 681 S.W.2d 925, 931 (Mo. 1984) (en bane) (state
mandated-provider law requiring reimbursement for chiropractors and psychologists was saved from
preemption by insurance-saving clause), vacated and remanded mem., 105 S. Ct. 3471 (1985) and
Insurance Comm'r v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 296 Md. 334, 339, 463 A.2d 793, 798 (1983) (state
mandated-provider law requiring payment for services of social workers was exempted from preemption by insurance-saving clause).
112. 51 Md. App. 122, 441 A.2d 1098 (1982), rev'd, 296 Md. 334, 463 A.2d 793 (1983).
113. Id. at 133, 441 A.2d at 1105.
114. Id. at 130-31, 441 A.2d at 1103-04 (citing Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co.,
440 U.S. 205 (1979)). The court also cited Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue
Shield, 624 F.2d 476, 483-84 (4th Cir. 1980), for support. See Metropolitan Life Ins, 51 Md. App. at
130, 441 A.2d at 1103.
115. Metropolitan Life Ins, 51 Md. App. at 130, 441 A.2d at 1103. The court also concluded
that the mandated-provider law "relate[d] to" the insured benefit plan and was thus subject to pre-
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The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the court of special appeals decision and held that the Maryland mandated-provider law is a
law that "regulate[s] insurance," and is therefore not preempted by
ERISA. 116 The court of appeals correctly recognized that ERISA's insurance-saving clause reflects the federal policy of state primacy in insurance regulation embodied in the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 11 7 The court
asserted, however, that the "plain and ordinary meaning of the language" of ERISA's insurance-saving clause indicates that Congress intended mandated-provider laws to be preserved from preemption as laws
regulating insurance. 118 For support of its position that Maryland's
mandated-provider law regulates insurance, the court cited a number of
cases which held that state mandated-benefit laws regulate insurance
within the meaning of the saving clause." 9
In analyzing whether the challenged mandated-provider statute regulates insurance, the court of appeals failed to recognize the critical distinction between mandated-benefit laws and mandated-provider laws.
Mandated-benefit laws, by requiring that specified risks be covered, operate to shift the risk of loss from policyholder to insurer.1 20 In contrast,
mandated-provider laws, by requiring that insurers pay for services of
specified providers, do not shift the risk of loss. 121 Mandated-benefit
laws directly regulate the insurer's relationship with insureds, and only
indirectly affect providers.122 Mandated-provider laws regulate the relationship between insurers and certain providers, and thus directly affect
enti-ies which are wholly outside of the insurance industry. 123 By thus
failing to distinguish between mandated-benefit and mandated-provider
laws, the court reached the erroneous conclusion that mandated-provider
laws regulate insurance.
More recently, the Supreme Court of Missouri, in Blue Cross Hospiemption because it "change[d] a term or condition with regard to the payment of a benefit under the
plan." Id. at 131, 441 A.2d at 1104.
116. Insurance Comm'r v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 296 Md. 334, 345, 463 A.2d 793, 798

(1983).
117. Id. at 341, 463 A.2d at 796.
118. Id. at 339-40, 463 A.2d at 795-96.
119. Id. at 341-45, 463 A.2d at 797-98. The court cited as primary support Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 77 (Ist Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978), and Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Whaland, 119 N.H. 894, 901-02, 410 A.2d 635, 640 (1979), both of which held that statutes
mandating mental health benefits regulate "insurance" and are thus preserved from ERISA preemption by the saving clause.
120. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
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tal Service v. Frappier,124 held that a Missouri mandated-provider statute
was not preempted by ERISA, on the ground that the law was insurance
regulation subject to the saving clause. 125
The Missouri court, in deciding that the mandated-provider law
"regulates insurance," held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption
for insurance "is not identical to" ERISA's exemption for state laws regulating insurance. 126 The court further concluded that the mandatedprovider law regulates insurance because it regulates insurance
12 7
companies.
The United States Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co. v. Massachusetts, however, clearly indicated that the ERISA saving
clause and the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption should be read consistently, because they serve the same federal policy and utilize similar
language.128 Cases interpreting the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
have identified essential criteria relevant to determining whether a particular practice constitutes insurance. Under this approach, a state law
does not regulate insurance simply because it purports to regulate insurance companies. 12 9 Rather, states may regulate only those130activities of
insurers that comprise the essential elements of insurance.
124. 681 S.W.2d 925, 932 (Mo. 1984) (en banc), vacated and remanded mem., 105 S. Ct. 3471
(1985).
125. Id. The decision also rested, in part, on a finding that the mandated-provider law did not
"relate to" ERISA plans. Id. at 931. Here the court reached two conclusions in conflict with the
decisions of the Supreme Court. The Missouri court concluded that ERISA preempts state regulation of employee benefit plans only in areas that are also specifically regulated by ERISA. Id. at 932.
The court also concluded that "indirect regulation of employee benefit plans is permissible provided
the regulation does not interfere with the purposes of ERISA." Id.
The Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985), and
in previous decisions, however, rejected this narrow view of ERISA preemption. The Metropolitan
Life Court, affirming its previous decision in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983), held that
ERISA preempts even those state laws falling "within its sphere" that do not conflict with its substantive requirements. Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 2389 (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98-99). See
supra note 52. The Metropolitan Life Court further noted that even indirect state regulation of
ERISA plans may be preempted. Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 2389.
126. Frappier,681 S.W.2d at 931.
127. Id.
128. 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2391-92 & n.21 (1985). See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, from a policy perspective it would be illogical to find that ERISA's saving clause
contained a broader exemption for state insurance regulation than Congress had granted to the states
through the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
129. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979) (quoting SEC v.
National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459-60 (1969)). See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
130. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979).
The Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Frappierwas vacated and remanded by the Supreme
Court for further consideration in light of the Court's decision in Metropolitan Life. See Blue Cross
Hosp. Serv. v. Frappier, 105 S. Ct. 3471 (1985) (mem.), vacating 681 S.W.2d 925 (Mo. 1984) (en
banc). On remand, the Missouri Supreme Court in a supplemental opinion, Blue Cross Hosp. Serv.
v. Frappier, 698 S.W.2d 326 (Mo. 1985) (en bane), readopted its previous decision, id. at 326, finding
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CONCLUSION

Mandated-provider laws, by changing the terms of insurance policies purchased by ERISA plans, clearly "relate to" these plans and thus
fall within ERISA's sphere of preemption. A more difficult question is
whether these laws are saved from ERISA preemption as laws that regulate "instjrance" within the meaning of the Act's saving clause. ERISA's
statutory language and legislative history fail to define adequately the
bounds of state regulation of insurance.
In a series of cases, however, the Supreme Court has precisely defined the zone of permissible state regulation of insurance in the context
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The Court has recognized that ERISA's
insurance-saving clause and the McCarran-Ferguson Act should be construed consistently with one another because both acts effectuate the
same federal policy of maintaining state primacy in the regulation of insurance. Application of the principles of these cases demonstrates that
mandated-provider laws do not regulate insurance. Thus, mandated-provider laws should be preempted as applied to insurance policies
purchased by employee benefit plans regulated by ERISA.
Robert S. McDonough

"no viable distinction" between mandated-provider statutes and the mandated-benefit statute in Metropolitan Life. Id. at 327.
The Missouri Supreme Court failed to recognize the critical distinction between mandated.
benefit laws and mandated-provider laws. See supra notes 67-70, 106-10 and accompanying text.
The court thus made the same error that the Maryland Court of Appeals made in InsuranceConmm'r
v. Metropolitan Life In& Co., 296 Md. 334, 463 A.2d 793 (1983). See text accompanying notes 11923.

